College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Popular Media

Faculty and Deans

1995

A Doctrine By Any Other Name: The Putative
Rejection of "Crashworthiness" in Virginia Products
Liability Law
Paul A. LeBel

Repository Citation
LeBel, Paul A., "A Doctrine By Any Other Name: The Putative Rejection of "Crashworthiness" in Virginia Products Liability Law"
(1995). Popular Media. 113.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media/113

Copyright c 1995 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media

PAUL A. LEBEL

A Doctrine By Any Other Name:
The Putative Rejection of "Crashworthiness"
in Virginia Products Liability Law
FEW issues in the modern law of products liabilitv are as
practically important and yet as conceptually confuscd as how
to take product mi~use into account when determining if a
plaintiff Illay recover for a product -related injury. [n sOllle Jurisdictions, misuse is treated as an affirmative defense.' while in
others, a plaintiff must disprove misuse of the product as part
of the prima facie case.' Even more troublesome is the variation among the states reganJing what conduct by a product
user constitute~ Illi~use. The variables can include such mattlTS as whether the use is one to whieh the product i~ intended to be put (e.g .. arc all unintended uses "misuses""), whether
the use is reasonably foreseeable (e.g .. are reasonablv foreseeable but unintended uses "misuses," or are they inste;d simply foreseeable uses?), whether the product has been put to its
unintended use by the acciden t victim or a third party (e.g ..
does thc "misuse'" operate as a plaintift"s conduct dcfense, or
a~ a matter of whether the product was defective, or as a matter ofv.·hether the defective condition is a proximate cause of
the harm"). and whether the use is unreasonably dangerous
(e.g., docs the viay the product was used have to constitute
negligence before it is treated as a "misuse')"").
Funherlllore.the role that product misuse plays in any given
case depends to a considerable extent on the kind of defectiveness allegation - a manufacturing flaw, a design defect,
or a failure to instruct and V'iarn adequately - that is bein"
made. The obligation to uesign a product to he reasonablv saf~
when misu~ed in a foreseeable manner can be c1isting~ished
from the obligation to warn about use in an unintended hut
foreseeable manner. One might imagine, for instance. a products liability plaintiff being successful in establishing a design
defect claim that a vehicle should provide greater protection
in the event of a collision. but !lot being successful in establishing a marketing defect claim that the manufacturer ~hould
have warned against letting the vehicle becomc involve:d in a
collision.
The strongest lesson that emerges from the product misuse
cases i~ that the tenninolog:y that courts use can he an unreliable guide to the v.'ays that the issues are resolved. In a recent
case. Slollt! r. (;l'llero{ M%l".I' Corp .. ' the Supreme COll1t of
Virginia waded into the conceptual thicket of product misuse.
The Court emerged with a doctrinal position about a product
manufacturer's design defect liability that is sound as a matter of buth la",,' and policy. hut that position need~ to be care-
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fully distinguished from the potentially misleading language
in which it was announced.
The plaintiff. Dolor Slone. owned and operated a dump truck
consisting of a cab and chassi~ manufactured by the defendant
General Motors Corporation. a dump bed manufactured hv the
defendant Pontaine Gody & Hoist Comp,my, ,md an ovcrha;"in o
cab shield manufactured and installed by an unknown p~rt)~
'vIr. Slone was injured in an accident that oee:urred at a Virginia
Department of Transportation depot. where he was dumping a
load of gravel. Pre-trial discovery about the accident lIIdicated
that the ground at the edge of a ramp collapsed while the truck
was still some distance from the edge. causing the truck to uverturn in a backwards nip. and serious ly injuring Mr. Slone as
the cab of the truck was crushed. [[e settled his action against
an employee of the depot. leaving the products liahilitv claims
against Gennal Motors and Fontaine. The Circuit CO~r1 granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme
Court of Virginia unanimously upheld the 'lllnmary judgment
in favor of Fontaine but, by a 5-2 vote. the Court reverseu the
summary judgment entered for General Motors and remanded
the case for further proceedings.
[n the context of design defectivenes~ litigation regarding
motor vehicles. a well -establi~hed doctrine of "crashworthiness" requires that the manufacturer's de~ign obligation includes
taking reasonable etfoI1s to protect a vehicle's occupants \,·'hen
the vehicle is involved in a collision. If that doctrine were to
be articulated In the terminology of product misuse, it would
simply reflect the undeniable re:ality that exp()~ure to the risk
of collision is an inevitable pan of the environment in which
vehicles are used, and thus involvement in a collision wou ld
bc designated as a reasonably foreseeable misuse or thc product for which reasonable design measures must be taken. Aftel'
SOllle initial hesitation.' the inclusion of a crashwonhine:ss dement in ve:hicle manufacturers' uesign obligations has been
part of the law of products liability in this country for nearl\,
thirty years.'
~
The Slolle decision purported to reject a crashworthiness
doctrine for Virginia. Wliting for a maJority of the Coul1, JusLice Hassell stated that "[ w]e find no reason to confuse our
well-settled jurisprudence hy injecti ng the doctrine of 'cra~h 
worthiness' and, therefore , we reject this doctrine. "" If that language of the opinion we:r'C taken at face value, it could mean
that occupants or veh icles involved in collisions were to be
denied the: benefit of safety precaution~ that reasonable: care

on the part of manufacturers would require to be bui It into thc
design of the vehicle~. Fortunately for Virginia consumers. the
Court's det:ision in SlolI£' actually operates in a much more
reasonable fa~hion than the crashworthine~s- re.iecting language
might indicate.
The quite unrcmarkable position taken by the majority in
SlolI£' is that a product~ liability plaintiH' mu~t prove that the
product was "unrcasunably dangerou~ either for the use to
which litl would ordinari ly be put or for some other reasonably fore~eeable purpo~e"" In previous cases. the COUtt said.
it had "implicitly reco!!niled that a manufacturer rnav be held
liable for the foreseeable misuse of it~ product. .. · Slo;le makes
explicit that earlier implicit recognition. but v. ithout qatine:
that recognition in terms of a requiremcnt that the \Thiclc mu;t
be reasonahly crashwol1hy.
One mi&ht rea~onahly ask whether it make~ any difference
\vhcthl'r the language in which court~ couch their decisions
corresponds to the practit:al operation uf tho~e decisions. The
suggestion that it ought to matter t:an be based on a number
of grounlb. For one thing. thi~ i~ a court that has di~played
eonsiderahle sensitivity to Iingui~tic preci~ion. ') The notion of
"crashWOI1hiness" is sufficiently a matter of ordinary language
meaning - and sufficiently distinguishahle from a notion of
"crash-proof' - that the COLll1 might have conceded that a
doctrine under that name is appropliatcly part of the law of
produch liability in this state. More significantly. perhaps. others may rely exclusively on the unqualified language about
rejecting the crashworthiness doctrine and pay insufficient
attention to the nuances of the more t:arefully constructed doctrine that is at:tually being applied. An c:xample of this latter
phenomenon occurred at the 199.'i meeting of the American
La v." In stitute. where Virginia was identified during the floor
dc:bate on the late~t Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Product~ Liability as having just rejected crashworthine~~ . That ~tatelllent is literally correct. hut without consiLlerable amplification. the statement offers a misleading
impre~sion of the ~tate of deSign defectiveness litigation i~
Virginia.
The dissenting opinion in SlolIl' offers a redllcfio ad ahslIrdllll1 argument against the recognition of a design ohligation
to make a vehicle rea~onably safe in the event of a collision.
Justices Compton and Whiting hypothe~i7ed that hecause "a
truck could he negligently driven into water." a manufacturer
mi ght he required "to equip the vehicle with pontoons."" In
the absence of buoyancy being precisely what was demanded
of a \'Chicle manufacturer. as in the case of the anlled force,
contracting with a manufacturer 10 produce a vehicle that can
be driven on land and also tloated across hodies of water. one
could conclude that an encounter between a vehicle and a hodv
of \vater is something for which the manufacturer has no desig~
ohligation.
A slight variation of the di~senter~' pontoon example will
reali~tically illustrate the extent of the reasunable de,i!!n obli<ration that is illlpmed on vehicle manufacturer,. Sup~o~e th:t
a pal1 icular feature of a Iinc: of vehicle~ i~ the ~lIdden and imlllediate inoperahility of a scat belt release mechanism when the
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lllechani~1ll i~ suhlllergc:d in water. It i~. of Ull,,·'e. not I!oinl!
to be true that the car has to bl' (il:signed ... 0 that it will ~ll'\e-r
be suhmerged. But could one responsibly ~ugge\l that a reasonable measure would not be demanded a~ part of the design
obligation to identify and cOlTect this design feature. recognizing that one uf the foreseeable accident \l'enarios or vehi cle use i~ the submersion of vehicles in water')
This illustration al~o supports another important Ies~()11 t:UIlcerning contemporary products liahilitv litil!ation. The defectiveness of a product is a nt.:cessary ~lcn;ent in a product~
liability claim. but proving defecti\'ene~, i... in ,u lfi cil'n t to
impose liability. When the f()CLI~ is on the derel'livene ... ~ of a
desi gn feature. as it was in SlolI£'. it is illlport;lIlt to understand
that defectiveness is only one of a number of critic;d elellll'nb
in litigation that include~ not only thl' rl'st of thl' plaintiff\
prima facie case hut also a range uf alTirnJativl' dt.:fen~e~ that
look at thl' plaintiff's conduct.
~or one thing. the defect must he causally relatl'd to thl' hann
in a way that satisfies hoth eause-in-fart and proximatl' GIUSl'
requirements . Suppose. for example. that thl' occupant of a car
v;,a, rendered uncon"eious hy an impal't prior to the \chicle
being submerged, and could not have tried to get thl' scat helt
unfastened. The inoperahility of tht.: scat helt rclease Il1cchanism would ~till he a produl't design defect. hut in thi, ,cl'nario.
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it would be a defect that was not causally related to the harm
to the occupant. Furthermore, affirmative defenses can come
into play to reduce or (in this state) to bar a product victim's
recovery. Even a defect that is a proximate cause of a plaintiff's harm would not be the basis of liability if the plaintiff
was negligent and that negligence was a substantial factor in
producing the injury.
An examination of Slone reveals a clear and a limited point.
The clear point is this: Manufacturers of motor vehicles have
to take into account the environment in which their products
will be used, and in a society in which fifty thousand people
die each year in traffic accidents, that environment unquestionably includes involvement in collisions. The limited point
is this: The design obligation to protect occupants of vehicles
- whether it is described as crashworthiness or simply as a
requirement to anticipate reasonably foreseeable misuses is to provide only reasonable safety precautions, not to build
in perfect protection from risks that are highly unlikely to be
encountered or that are excessively difficult to eliminate.
Litigating products liability cases with that focus on reasonable protection should not be conceptually difficult in this
state. Over the last thirty years, while the products liability
train around the nation has roared off down the tracks of strict
liability in tort, Virginia has remained on the fault-based tort
platform . Now, given the reform measures that have been
adopted by many state legislatures, proposed in Congress, and
are being written into the latest version of the Restatement of
Torts, it is evident that the momentum toward strict liability
has diminished. Indeed, it appears that the strict liability train
that Virginia refused to board seems to be limping back into
the fault-based liability station.
The most important defining characteristic of the newlyemerging national consensus on design defect determinations
is that those determinations should consider whether a reasonable alternative design for the product would have eliminated foreseeable risks. " That characteristic of a design defect
is virtually impossible to distinguish from a determination that
the product was negligently designed. ' 2
The decision in Slone simply acknowledges that a legitimate
issue in a products liability case is whether reasonable care was
exercised in the design of a vehicle to protect an occupant from
an unreasonable risk of harm in the event of a reasonably fore seeable accident. That is not to say that the cab of this dump
truck must have been strong enough to withstand the crushing
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force that it was subjected to in this accident - that is a matter of proof for the plaintiff to offer. iJ It is to say, however, that
the structural integrity of the cab does not disappear from the
manufacturer 's design responsibility simply because the truck
was involved in an unintended flip. The Slone decision is comfortably located, historically and conceptually. within this state's
long-standing refusal to apply strict liability in tort, and is perfectly consistent with a commitment to recognizing manufacturer liability for culpable design choices.
ENDNOTES

I. See, e.x.. Bowling v. Hcil Co., 31 Ohio S1. 3d 277. 282. 511 .E.2d
373.377 (1987): "Currently. two affirmative dcfenscs based upon a plaintiff 's misconduct are recognized .... rA) defendant is provided with a
complete defense if thc plaintiff misw,ed the product in an unforcseeable manner.··
2. See. e.g. Hughcs v. Magic Chef. Inc .. 288 N.W. 2d 542. 545 (Iowa
1980): " Misusc is not an affirmative defem,e but rathcr has to do with
all elemeflf of/he plain/iff'.' own case'" (emphasi, in original).
3. 249 Va . _.457 S.E.2d at 51 (1995)
4. Evans v. General Motors Corp .. 359 F2d 822 (7th Cir.) , cert.
denied. 385 .S 836 (1966).
5. The leading case adopting a crash worthiness requircmcnt is Larsen
v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). The Evans casc
c ited in the previous notc was overruled in Huff v. White Motor Corp ..
565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977)
6. 249 Va. at _ . 457 S.E.2d at 53.
7. Id. at _, 457 S.E.2d at 54. quoting from Logan v. Montgomery
Ward , 216 Va. 425, 428.219 S.E.2d 685. 687 (1975).
8. Id. at _ .457 S.E.2d at 54.
9. See, e.g .. Mcrillat Industries. Inc. v. Parks. 246 Va . 429.436 S.E.2d
600 ( 1993) (employec's injury resultin g from repetitive stress was nei ther an "injury hy accident" nor a "disease" and thus wm. not within the
scope of the workers' compensation system).
10. 249 Va . at _, 457 S.E.2d at 56 (dissenting opinion).
II. See R ESTATE lENT (THIRD) OF TORTS : PRODUcrS IJABII .IIY ~ 2(b)
(Tentative Draft No.2. 1995): " A produci is defective in design when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avo ided hy the adoption of a reasonahle alternative design
... and tbe omission of the alternative desi g n renders the produ ct not reasonably safe'"
12. Some strictness could be retained under the proposed Restate ment provision if liability wcre to be extended to ,ellers other than the
party whose conduct was actually neg ligent in the design of the prodUCI.

13 . The di sse nting opinion illustrates the cri tical importance of how
the misuse is described. The dissenters focused on the collapse of the
ramp. and treated that as an event that was not foreseeabl e to the manufacturer of the truck.
The more appropriate question to ask. howeve r. is whether the force,
to which the cab of the truck wa, subjected werc similar to those that
would he encountered in a collision that involved a rollover. If that ques tion is answered in the affirmative. then the allegedly surpri,ing nature
of the sequence of events in the instant case would not rclin'c the manufacturer of the obligation to take rcasonahle mea,ures to protect thc
occupants from those forces.

